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Civil Disobedience and
Natural Law
By MAPxK R. MAcGuiGAN*
There is a sense in which the question of obedience to law is
a problem solely for the natural lawyer. The positivist is con-
cerned by hypothesis with the validity and legality of law, not
with its efficacy or justice. Validity and legality are purely
formal concepts: law is valid, it is 'legal," if it is enacted or
adjudicated into being in the proper form. Efficacy and justice
on the other hand, are concerned with the content of the legal
rule: a law is efficacious when it is actually being obeyed by the
people whose conduct it aims to govern, and it is just when it
should be obeyed by them. The natural lawyer is interested in
efficacy and justice as well as in validity and legality, and so it
would appear that only for him is conformity to law a problem
qua jurisprudent or even qua jurist.' For him the ultimate
theoretical question in jurisprudence "what is law?" has as a
counterpart at the other end of the scale an ultimate practical
question (and one by no means unrelated to the first theoretical
question) "should this particular law be obeyed?"
Yet it would seem that to the more sophisticated positivist
today, fidelity to law has also become a jurisprudential issue.
Professor H. L. A. Hart has recently made the point2 that
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto.
I The natural lawyer is more interested in justice than in efficacy, but in
order to know whether a law, even a morally good one, can be borne by a par-
ticular people at a particular time, he must also know whether it is or will be
efficacious. For example, moralists appear to be reaching the conclusion that a
law forbidding professional boxing would be good, but it is highly doubtful
whether it would yet be supported by popular feeling.
Interest in the efficacy of law is, of course, considered more characteristic of
the sociological jurisprudent than of the natural lawyer. For purposes of this
discussion I have assimilated the sociologist's position to that of the naturalist, as
both, in contrast to the positivist, have justicistic philosophies.
There is a sharp attack on the empty formalism of the strict positivist view
on the ground that it is incompatible with the rule of law in democratic society in
D'Entr~ves, Legalita e Legittimita, Studi in Onore de Emilio Grosa (1960).2 Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev.
593, 620-21 (1958).
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positivism has a moral as well as an intellectual contribution to
make to jurisprudence: one of the most beneficial results of
keeping the spheres of law and morals entirely separate is that
moral criticism of law is kept clear, simple, and powerful. Hart
presents his view as a mere restatement of Bentham and Austin,
but in truth it is a wholesome innovation within positivism.
Whether or not Professor Fuller is being overly optimistic in
believing that Professor Hart's contribution to jurisprudential
dialogue eliminates once and for all "the pretense of the ethical
neutrality of positivism,"3 at least it establishes a precedent for
the consideration by positivists too of problems of civil dis-
obedience. Thus recent events in Birmingham, Alabama, and
Cambridge, Maryland, where the minority demonstrated in pro-
test against inadequate legal guarantees of equality, and in Ox-
ford, Mississippi, and Tuscaloosa, Alabama, where the majority
resisted the extension of equality, are common jurisprudential
ground for positivist and naturalist alike, though the orientation
of the reflections may well be different. My own observations will
be made within a natural law framework, but will, I hope, also
appear relevant to those in other jurisprudential traditions.
The popular attitude towards civil disobedience is somewhat
ambivalent. On the one hand, popular feeling exalts peace and
order in society almost to the status of an absolute and views with
strong disapproval any form of disobedience to lawful authority.
For historical illustrations of this attitude the events of the last
year or two will serve as well as any. The violent resistance of
the students at the University of Mississippi to the court-ordered
admission of a Negro student to their institution was regarded
most unsympathetically by the vast majority of Canadians and
Americans. The popular feeling was accurately expressed by
President Kennedy when in his address to the people of the
United States on September 80, 1962, he stated in the following
words the citizen's duty of obedience to the law of the land:
"Americans are free . . . to disagree with the law-but not to
disobey it."4 Similarly in the 1962 Saskatchewan medicare dis-
pute between the government and the medical profession many
who were sympathetic to the physicians' viewpoint nevertheless
3 Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 630, 672 (1958).
4 New York Times, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 22, col 6.
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strongly opposed their withdrawal of services as an attempt to
nullify an enactment of the legislature. This point of view was
expressed by the Toronto Globe and Mail, when it wrote a
propos of medicare disputes in general, words which echo Presi-
dent Kennedy's: "Canadians have the right to disagree with a law,
but once a law has been duly passed by a duly elected govern-
ment, they do not have the right to disobey that law."5 On the
one hand, then, there is the unequivocal view that citizens do not
have the right to disobey the law, however unjust they may
consider it.
But this is not the whole story. There is a long tradition of
support in the Western world for resistance and even revolution
to unjust laws or unjust rulers. For instance, do we not all applaud
the very nearly successful attempt of the German conspirators
to assassinate Adolph Hitler on July 20, 1944? Moreover, aside
from those few who believe with Rebecca West that all revolu-
tions are vicious, is there not now general approbation of the
American Revolution, even among the British? Indeed, there is
Biblical support for revolution in the revolts of the Hebrews under
the Machabees against their foreign oppressors.
Disobedience of civil authority has been throughout human
history both fact and theory. As fact, disobedience has ranged
from the more to the less violent, according to the nature of the
person or law resisted and the temper of the men who formed
the resistance; among the forms of civil disobedience has taken
have been revolution, regicide, "underground" resistance, riots,
strikes, picketing, refusal to obey superior orders, boycotts of
commodities, hunger strikes, freedom rides, marches, sit-ins, pro-
test meetings, and simple non-compliance. As theory, disobedi-
ence has been the subject of consideration by philosophers not so
much from the viewpoint of whether it is legitimate at all, and
if so, when; a few philosophers like Hobbes have taught that
resistance to political authority is unjustifiable in all circum-
stances, but for the most part philosophers have developed
theories of resistance, and have attempted to say when it is
justifiable and when it is not.'
5 Toronto Globe and Mail, Oct. 30, 1962, p. 6, col. 6.
6 Hobbes allows the exercise of the right of self-defense by an individual
against the sovereign, but maintains that no one else may assist him. Hobbes,
Leviathan 147-157 (Waller ed. 1904).
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Neither American, nor Western, nor world history or political
theory will allow us, then, to interpret in an absolutistic way
President Kennedy's words that a citizen is free "to disagree with
the law-but not to disobey it." There are too many precedents
on the other side for us to be consistent in denying all civil dis-
obedience. What we might perhaps like to say, I suppose, is that
laws which we think are good ought to be obeyed, and those
which we think are unjust ought not to be obeyed, but it requires
little sophistication to see that we cannot devise a neutral
rationalization assigning to ourselves such powers of judgment
without at the same time granting them to our fellow citizens,
whose views as to justice and injustice may not be the same as
ours. The white Southerner, for instance, resists desegregation
according to law, not merely because he is firmly attached to the
status quo of white supremacy, but because he honestly believes
in white supremacy on moral grounds, however mistaken they
may be objectively. We must recognize that, in attempting to
force desegregation on the Southern minority, the American
majority is attempting to substitute its morality for the minority
morality. This is not to say that it should not be done, but it
would be naive to expect to do it without encountering re-
sistance.
In the ancient world the tyrant was a well-known figure both
in fact and in theory. Though neither Plato nor Aristotle could
be said to have had a complete theory of resistance to tyrants,
both recognized the necessity of disobedience when those in
power were ruling for their own good and not for the common
good, and Plato's master, Socrates, chose death in preference to
submission to commands which violated his sense of justice.7
But it was not until the later Middle Ages that the problem
of resistance became a definite part of political theory. Even
then there were a few voices raised on the side of patient
submission to tyranny, most notably that of John Wyclif, but by
far the greater number of thinkers advocated more active re-
sistance. John of Salisbury in the twelfth century advocated the
overthrow of tyrants, including death if necessary, though he
7 Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that both Plato and Aristotle
recognized the fact, rather than the theory, of resistance to tyrants. Plato, Re-
public VIII, 565-569; Plato, Politics V, 10.
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qualified this by warning that poison was not a permissable
weapon even against tyrants and that no one who was under an
oath to a tyrant might kill him. Others soon dropped the quali-
fications and by 1407 Jean Petit was maintaining it to be a
meritorious act for any subject to kill a tyrant or to cause him to
be killed.'
By far the most important medieval treatment of civil dis-
obedience was that of St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Thomas' fullest
consideration of the issue is in an early work, his Commentary
on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, in the context of a discussion
of the obedience owed by Christians to the secular power.' His
primary principle is that political authority is derived from God
and therefore binding in conscience on Christians. There are,
however, some cases in which authority is defective in title or
exercise and therefore not derived from God, and in such cases
there is no obligation of obedience. (The defect of personal
unworthiness for his office in the ruler is not a sufficient ground
for disobedience, since the duty of disobedience does not rest on
the worthiness of the superior.) The first of the two situations in
which the right to disobey arises is where the ruler has seized
power illegally, though where his title is subsequently legitimated
by the consent of the people or by the intervention of a higher
authority the duty of obedience resumes.
The second situation in which the subject is freed from his
duty of obedience is where the ruler abuses his authority. Where
the abuse of authority is of such a character that, though the
ruler is exceeding his legal power, he is not commanding the
subject to the performance of something evil in itself, or for-
bidding him to perform something good in itself, then the subject
is free either to obey or disobey; but where the abuse is of such
a character that the ruler is commanding a sinful act, "in such a
case not only is there no obligation to obey the authority, but
one is obliged to disobey it, as did the holy martyre, who
suffered death rather than obey the impious commands of
tyrants."
In summary, then, for Aquinas a subject is not bound to obey
a ruler who has either usurped power or who, though legitimate,
8 On these and other medieval theories see Jaszi and Lewis, Against the
Tyrant 17-34 (1957).
9 Aquinas, Scriptur Super Sententlis, II, dist. 44, quest. 2, art. 2 (1932).
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is ruling unjustly-though in a later text he adds the qualification,
"unless perhaps to avoid scandal or greater evil"-and when a
ruler contravenes the very purpose of his authority by ordering a
sinful action, the subject is under an obligation not to obey.
This is without question a theory of disobedience, but it is
far from clear that it is a theory of active resistance. St. Thomas
does allow active resistance and even tyranicide where a ruler
has possessed himself of power through violence and there is no
possibility of appeal to a higher authority who could pass judg-
ment on the case, but his reference to the early Christian martyrs
would suggest that he does not mean to endorse anything more
than passive resistance in situations of abuse of authority. This,
indeed, is how he is read by his quasi-official commentator,
Cardinal Cajetan, who says that a tyrant who has usurped power
may rightly be killed by a private person, but that a tyrant who
has gained power legitimately may not be killed, no matter how
iniquitous his rule.10 This would tie in, too, with the view
expressed in that work of somewhat doubtful Thomistic authenti-
city, the De Regno, that private persons should not on their own
private presumption attempt to kill rulers who are tyrants, but
that it is quite legitimate for a people which has the right of
providing itself with a ruler to depose (and presumably slay, if
he fights back) a tyrant, for this is not done by the private
prsumption of a few but rather by public authority."
Tyrannicide, and resistance generally, was largely a specula-
tive problem in the Middle Ages, but with the Renaissance and
the wars of religion it became a practical political issue as
well. The immediate effect of the Protestant Revolution was to
strengthen the hand of those on the side of authority, for both
Luther and Calvin stressed the duty of obedience to rulers.1
2
For Calvin active resistance was never permissible; even a
wicked ruler might not be resisted-though a subject must never
perform sinful acts at the ruler's bidding, his only right is to
endure punishment passively. Calvin's follower, John Knox, was,
however, of a different mind, and was not hesitant in telling
Mary Queen of Scots that princes-and princesses-who exceed
10 Cajetan, Commentarium in Summa Theologiae, 1-11, quest. 64, art. 3
(1897).
11 Aquinas, On Kingship ch. 6 (1949).
12 On Luther and Calvin see Jaszi and Lewis, op. cit. supra note 8, at 44-48.
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their bounds might be resisted with force by their subjects; and in
France it was not long before persecution of the Huguenots
drove them to the position that it is lawful to resist tyrants.
Catholic theory, too, began to stress more and more the
theory of active resistance to tyranny, perhaps given impetus by
Catholic practice. Henry III of France, for example, was as-
sassinated by a Dominican friar who, himself killed on the spot,
was proclaimed as a martyr by his Order and by many other
Catholics. The theoretical foundations of the practice were sup-
plied by a Spanish Jesuit, Mariana, who wrote about the year
1600.
Mariana's Jesuit contemporary, Suarez, held largely to the
position of St. Thomas, distinguishing between the tyrant who is
a usurper and the tyrant who is a legitimate ruler but who abuses
his power. Force may be used against a usurper, he holds, but
against a legitimate tyrant only passive resistance is available as
a weapon. Further, he cautions that even in the case of a
usurper submission is better than revolt, unless the tyrant's
oppression becomes intolerable.'3
Mariana did not, however, write with Suarezian caution and
he defended in no uncertain terms the Dominican assassin of
Henry III, who was clearly a legitimate ruler and not a usurper.
Mariana openly endorsed the right of a private individual to slay
a legitimate king turned tyrant, though he does append the
qualification that he may not do so until the tyrant has first been
warned by the assembly of the people that he is in danger of
deposition and has failed to heed the warning. However, if the
tyrant prevents the convening of a public assembly, public
judgment is rendered impossible, and an assassin may then pro-
ceed on the basis of his own judgment enlightened by the counsel
of 'learned and grave men." The Dominican assassin had ful-
filled this latter condition because before performing the deed he
had consulted the theologians of his Order. 4
Mariana's book was burned by the authorities in France and
his views increased the hostility of non-Catholics-and some
Catholics-towards the Jesuits, but in the long run his ideas
carried the day. The principles of Suarez and Bellarmine led
13 Suarez, Defensio Fidei Catholicae et Apostolicae ch. 4 (1618).
14 Mariana, De Rege et Regis Institutione I, chs. 5, 6 (1605).
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logically in the same direction, particularly their opposition to the
divine right of kings and their advocacy of the theory that a ruler
derives his authority immediately from the people and only
ultimately from God: 15 such doctrines could logically lead only
to one conclusion, that in any circumstances in which a ruler
turns into a tyrant, whether he was originally a legitimate ruler
or not, he may be deposed by the people, even by force if
necessary. This became the generally accepted view in the
secular world with the theories of Locke and Jefferson and the
American and French Revolutions in the eighteenth century, and
more especially with the rise of liberal democracy in the nine-
teenth century. The Catholic fought a rearguard action against
popular sovreignty (and especially popular revolutions) through-
out most of the nineteenth century, but with the accession of Leo
XIII to the papacy in 1878 the triumph of the democratic view
and the concomitant theory of active resistance to all tyran-
nical rule was assured.
In developing a natural-law theory of civil disobedience we
must first of all clearly understand that ordinarily law is binding
in conscience and must be obeyed in full. St. Thomas Aquinas'
statement of this 6 is that a law which is just obliges in con-
science, and he goes on to say that it is just if it is for the common
good, if it establishes burdens on a basis of proportionate
equality, and if it issues from duly constituted authority. A rule
which does not meet all of these requirements does not oblige in
conscience, except to avoid scandal, i.e., where it would encour-
age disrespect for law generally. There is no room in this theory
for the pernicious theory of purely penal law, the theory that law
does not bind in conscience and that the only moral obligation
is to pay the penalty assessed if one is caught in a violation.
Every law which is just is for the common good and must be
obeyed. Of course, such a theory imposes grave obligations on
both ruler and subject.
On the side of the legislator, there is an obligation to govern
in accordance with right reason and the exigencies of the com-
mon good. The legislator's duty is to guide the people to good,
to expand their moral horizons. This he cannot do directly, but
15 Suarez, Defensio Fidei Catholicae et Apostolicae m, ch. 2 (1613).
16 Aquinas, Summna Theologiae I-11, quest. 96, art. 4 (1949).
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must concentrate on creating favourable conditions for the de-
velopment of fully mature persons, who will seek good, not
because they are ordered to do so, but by reason of its own
attractiveness to them.
On the side of the citizen there is the corresponding duty to
respond to the reasonable guidance of the legislator. The subject
must be docile towards the law either because he recognizes its
intrinsic reasonableness or because he accepts its utility, even
when it is in itself no more reasonable than the contrary rule
would have been. But more important than docility to the law is
engagement with it. The full moral life requires participation by
the citizen in the legal process in that he must himself ratify or
approve by an act of his own judgment the judgment of the
legislator as expressed in the law, so that his obedience to the law
can be the result of his own reasonable will, and not merely
imposed from without.
Now obviously the citizen cannot himself give prolonged
consideration to every law that may affect him. In the vast
majority of cases he must be able to rely on the legislator's
judgment, for social life could not function successfully if every
man had to verify and justify in his own mind the reasonableness
of every law before he obeyed it. Yet blind submission to author-
ity is not enough for the full moral life; some understanding of
the purpose and purport of the law is necessary.
It is especially necessary that a citizen should satisfy himself
as fully as possible of the justice of any law which makes special
demands on him because of its relation to his profession or mode
of life. The purpose of the process of ratification by the citizen
is that he will thus be able to make the legislator's judgment his
own, and obey the law, nay embrace the law, not because the
legislator threatens him with sanctions if he does not, but
because his reason demands that he act this way.
It is possible, however, that the subject's consideration of a
given law will lead him to have doubts as to its reasonableness.
In such a case he has the obligation to do what is necessary to
resovle his doubt. First, he should engage in a study of the issue
involved-and it is hardly necessary to add that the extent of the
study made should be proportionate to the importance of the
issue. Second, he should consult with others, especially those
[Vol..52,
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learned in the problem; as Chief Justice Warren remarked
recently, "none of us is so perfect as to be able to rely solely on
his individual judgment in moral issues, especially those which
involve his deepest emotions." 17 A Christian should obviously
include among his counselors in ethics theologians and ministers
of religion.
If after deliberation and consultation, the citizen is still in
doubt as to the reasonableness of the law, the presumption that
the law is just comes into play. The famous maximum of St.
Alphonsus Ligouri, lex in dubio praesumitur justa8 (when it is
doubtful, the law is presumed to be just), resembles the maxim
of the common law, omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse
acta (all acts are presumed to have done rightly and regularly).
The presumption contained in these maxims is what lawyers call
a rebuttable presumption and not an irrebuttable one.
Even if the citizen decides that the law is unjust, he must still
make a decision as to whether to obey or not. In some cases, St.
Thomas suggests that the citizen must disobey; these are cases in
which the law in question is intrinsically evil and commands that
the particular citizen directly perform an evil act, or forbids the
performance of some good act.'9 There is no ready-made casuistry
for such cases, but it would seem clear that while in such a case
a citizen must disobey the particular law, he would not thereby
necessarily have leave to disobey the government in other par-
ticulars. For example, there are legal procedures in some U.S.
states which provide for sterilization of the feeble-minded and
the indigent. Catholics believe that such sterilization laws are
immoral and they may not, of course, obey these laws in any
particular. However, the vast majority of Catholics would never
have any occasion to come into contact with such laws and they
cannot use their disapproval of government action in this one
sphere to serve as an excuse to disobey the laws generally. Not
17 Warren, The Law Beyond the Law, Washington Sunday Star, Nov. 25,
1962, p B-2 col 5.
18 St. Aphonsus, Theologia Moralis I, n. 9; I, n. 617 (1778). Dr. Gordon
Zahn, in his book German Catholics and Hitler's Wars (1962), has recently called
attention to the abuse of the presumption of justice by churchmen in Nazi Ger-
many. There is no reason in a totalitarian dictatorship for a presumption that law
is just, at least not with regard to politically motivatedlaws. In my view there is a
burden of proof on such a government to establish the justice of its enactments.
19 Aquinas, supra note 16.
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even the Catholics who might be professionally involved with
such laws could, I think, take such an approach. Unless the
immoral law were of such a kind as to give rise to a general
system of injustice, the disobedience even of the group directly
concerned with the injustice would have to be restricted to the
area of injustice.
Beside cases in which disobedience is mandatory, there are
also cases of unjust laws where the injustice is not of so serious a
nature, and where according to St. Thomas disobedience of the
particular unjust law is permissible but not mandatory. St.
Thomas, however, points out that in cases of this kind obedience
may conceivably be required for extrinsic reasons, that is, to
avoid scandal or greater evil.20 For example, the unjust law
might be of a very minor nature so that obedience to it would do
very little harm, whereas public flouting of it might have the
effect of bringing the law generally into disrepute and lead
others to take a lighter view of the law than they ought. Or even
if the unjust law imposed a more serious burden on those affected
by it, disobedience to it might not be possible without giving
rise to large-scale civil unrest and even bloodshed, and the cost
of disobedience might be thus greater than the good to be
achieved.
No answer can be given on principle to such cases, for they
are entirely a matter of the prudential balancing of the degree
of good that would be achieved by disobedience on the one
hand and the degree of evil that would be caused by the dis-
obedience on the other. But it goes almost without saying that
no one should decide on a course of civil disobedience where
the repercussions are likely to be of any significance at all with-
out serious study and without consultation with men of learning
and wisdom.
It will surprise no one that in a situation where the solution
depends upon individual prudential application of principle, with
the principles so general as to be of only minimal assistance and
with almost the whole field thus left to prudence, different men
will come to different conclusions. There is an amusing story in
this connection about Thoreau and Emerson. Thoreau as you
know wrote a book called On the Duty of Civil Disobedience, a
201 ,id.
[Vol. 52,
Civ, DisoBEDIENcE AND NATuRAL LAw
subject he took quite seriously, and in 1845 he personally seceded
from the United States as the most efficacious protest he could
make against a country which tolerated slavery. As part of his
anti-slavery campaign he spent a night in jail by way of protest.
When Emerson went to see him in jail, he said, "What are you
doing in there, Henry?" Thoreau looked at him through the bars
and replied: "What are you doing out there, Ralph?"2 '
So far we have considered the general attitude towards dis-
obedience and the justification found in a particular moral
philosophy for disobedience, but we have done no more than
mention in passing the forms that disobedience should take. To
this we must now turn our attention.
The basic distinction to be drawn in this area is between
active and passive resistance. This distinction does not express
the difference between doing something and doing nothing, but
rather the difference between a violent response to injustice and
a non-violent response. Passive resistance involves action just
as much as does active resistance; campaigns of passive resistance
have normally been opened by acts of commission rather than
by those of omission, but they have been peaceful rather than
violent acts of commission.
There are a number of forms of passive or non-violent
resistance. A distinction sometimes drawn is between non-
cooperation and civil disobedience. Non-cooperation is the more
passive of the two, involving usually resignation of certain
benefits enjoyed under the system attacked, whereas civil dis-
obedience involves the performing of certain acts which will
compel a response by dominant group, whether it take the form
of arrest of the resisters or some other form.
By far the most important form of passive resistance, however,
is that developed by Mahatma Gandhi in the Union of South
Africa before the First World War and in India after the war.
Gandhi gave the name of "Satyagraha" to this type of resistance,
from the Indian words "satya," love, and "agraha," firmness of
force. Satyagraha is therefore "the Force which is born of Truth
and Love," to use Gandhi's own words.
Gandhi distinguished "satyagraha" from ordinary passive re-
21 This story is related in Buchanan and Lyford, A Conversation on Revolu-
tion 18 (1962).
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sistance on the basis of the motives of the resisters. Orthodox
passive resistance results from the weakness of the resisters. The
overriding consideration is not non-violence but expediency, and
the resisters would not necessarily eschew violence if their
strength were equal to or greater than the strength of the
majority. In "satyagraha," however, non-violence is an expression
of strength, not of weakness, for it relies on the moral superiority
of the soul over the body, and in Gandhi's case at least it was
accompanied by a belief that violence is sinful under all cir-
cumstances.
One authority, Leo Kuper,22 objects to this formulation of
the distinction because of the difficulty of analyzing motives and
because of the dissimilarity in motives among "satyagrahis." He
suggests a distinction rather in terms of the means by which
change is to be effected. From this viewpoint orthodox passive
resistance aims at change through embarrassment of the rulers,
whereas "satyagraha" aims at change through conversion of the
rulers.
Common forms of orthodox passive resistance are processions,
strikes, picketing, withholding of labor, boycott of administrative
positions (such as posts in segregated departments), and boycott
of commodities. The choice of means depends on the kind of
society involved, and the relationship between ends and means
is direct and observable. Success will usually depend on the
extent of mass participation, because this will extend the em-
barrassment of the rulers.
"Satyagraha" is a method of securing rights by the suffering
of the resister, not of the persons resisted. Thus suffering is a
positive value in Gandhi's theory, one which is actively sought,
and so "satyagraha" sets force as well as the laws at nought. The
end sought is not the embarrassment or coercion of the govern-
ment, but rather the conversion of the rulers through the suffering
of the resisters. Some of the means used by "satyagrahis" may be
the same as those used by orthodox passive resisters, but the
preferred technique is a breach of laws the violation of which
does not involve moral evil in itself-the breach of more regula-
tions, for example. There need be no direct relationship between
22 Kuper, Passive Resistance in South Africa (1956). For my discussion of
passive generally I am much indebted to Mr. Kuper s analysis.
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means and ends; it is sufficient if the conscience of the majority
is stirred by any act of the "satyagrahis," however remote from
the cause of the resistance. Hence the Ghandian fast or hunger
strike.
For "satyagraha" to succeed there must be a certain amount
of cooperation on both sides. On the one side the rulers must
impose the punishment prescribed by law for the violation of the
ordinance. Publicity is essential so that the knowledge of the
fact and the purpose of the suffering is brought home to all
members of the ruling majority. Thus for success the act of
resistance must be public and the trial must also be public and
publicized. On the side of the "satyagrahis" resistance must stop
short of the complete breakdown of the social order. Moreover,
the "satyagrahis" must absolutely avoid all bitterness toward the
rulers, for the whole campaign must be conducted with love.
In practice, aside from Gandhi's fasts, pure "satyagraha" has
seldom, if ever, been realized, and even Gandhi relied to some
extent on mass following and accepted the impure motives of
many of his followers. Perhaps it is unreasonable to expect the
total exclusion of considerations of expediency from any move-
ment, and more profitable to observe the general tendency en-
gendered, but it is important to stress the utmost purification of
means.
Gandhi's "satyagraha" was able to succeed in South Africa
and in India both because it was able to gain support at the
expense of its own purity and because (and I think this is the
more significant reason) his victims were the British, who, in the
long run, at least, have always proved themselves a people of
tender conscience. "Satyagraha" in Hitlerite Germany or in
Stalinist Russia would have been worthless, and it is an open
question whether the commitment of the majority in both South
Africa and the southern United States today to their ideologies
of white supremacy is not so strong and so blind that a more
active resistance is not the eventual solution.23
Be that as it may, I think it is not open to dispute that the
more suitable form of resistance in a democratic society such as
we live in is passive resistance, and that in most circumstances
2 3 In fact Negro protests in the United States in 1963 seem to be verging
more and more towards active resistance.
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the counsel of passive resistance assumes the dimensions of a
moral imperative. The physicians in Saskatchewan did not in-
fringe this principle, but the students at the University of Mis-
sissippi did, and agregiously. In this sense, then, we can justify
President Kennedy's remark that "Americans are free . . . to
disagree with the law-but not to disobey it." Interpreted to
mean that there is no right of resistance to duly enacted law in
democratic society, the statement appears both to contradict
Western history and to violate sound moral doctrine. But in-
terpreted to mean that in a democratic society there is a right to
express disagreement with the law through various forms of
passive resistance but that there is not a right to disobey the law
violently, the statement appears to be a reasonable commentary
on the normal conditions in a free society, where violent revolu-
tions are not necessary in order to overthrow the existing regime,
for a mere majority of ballots cast at a stated interval will peace-
fully obtain the same result.
A democracy should be tolerant of minorities, even to the
extent of allowing them to indulge in civil disobedience as far
as is compatible with the common good. Minorities, on their
part, must not only display a general respect for the law, but
must also be painstaking in their awareness of the importance of
purity of means. The physicians in Saskatchewan would have
been on much surer moral ground if, instead of withdrawing
their services from the public they had utilized the nobler means
of carrying on as usual but refusing to accept the government's
pay checks. But at least the physicians were attempting to change
a merely external thing, a statute (and one which they felt was
extremely unjust), and were not primarily concerned with at-
tempting to change an attitude or state of mind.
It is not easy to make a true judgment of situations which are
still in flux. It was, of course, easy to judge even at the time that
the violent mob of rebellious students in Oxford, Mississippi, was
acting wrongfully, but most other situations are not so clearcut.
My own feeling is that the nuclear disarmers in Great Britain,
who are attempting to achieve a moral result, conversion to a
belief in the necessity of disarming, through physical means
(mass sitdowns in the streets, disturbances at American naval
bases) suitable only for the embarrassment of the rulers and not
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for their conversion, are acting beyond and against the rule of
law, whereas the Negro demonstrators in Birmingham, Alabama,
are acting in an acceptable manner. In the latter case the mob is
essentially peaceful in intent and performance, it is aiming pri-
marily at an external achievement-equality in accommodation,
service, and employment,-and it is reacting against a long-
standing grievance which has failed to respond to any other
treatment.2 4 At this writing the fate of the President's new civil
rights legislation has not been decided, but it is obvious at least
that without the events in Birmingham no such bill would have
been even proposed this year.
I have not stressed in this paper the objective character of
the natural-law principles and the moral precepts which judge
law. For one thing there is far from total agreement, even among
natural lawyers, as to their content. More important, even when
there is agreement on the principles, there may quite possibly be
disagreement in practice, for the ultimate determinant in this
area is a prudential judgment. This is not to say that there is no
objectivity, but merely to say that it does not seem profitable to
emphasize it.2"
One rule that can be laid down with certainty is that the
question as to whether or not to disobey a law cannot be answered
in abstraction from the question as to what forms of disobedience
will be employed should resistance be resolved upon. If the con-
crete situation is such that only active resistance can be of any
avail in righting the injustice, then clearly the preponderance of
good resulting from the overthrow of the existing order would
have to be overwhelming indeed in order to justify such a step
in a democracy.
But if in the situation at hand passive resistance, especially
in one of its lesser forms, might be efficacious in restoring the
order of justice, then the decision to resist might be taken with
a much lesser preponderance of resultant good. In a totalitarian
2 4 A judgment of this kind is very tenuous because, of course, the Negroes
in the U. S. are also hopeful of changing the attitudes of whites.2 5 There is much more objectivity in the question whether a particular law
is good or bad than in the question of disobedience to a bad law. In the latter
case one must establish not only that the law is bad, which may be capable of
demonstration, but also that toleration of it is worse than disobedience. Even men
who agree on the evil of a law may disagree as to whether they ought to oppose it,
even passively.
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society, of course, the decision to resist may be taken compara-
tively easily, but it is highly doubtful if any measures of passive
resistance will prove efficacious.
In summary, then, we the people are possessed of the right
to disobey an unjust law, but we must exercise our right with
great restraint, particularly when it is a question of violent
resistance. And in a free society the normal form of disobedience
to law, where disobedience is tolerable at all, is passive re-
sistance, and only the most extraordinary circumstances could
conceivably justify the employment of violent means of re-
sistance. Our liberty, if it is to endure for more than a passing
moment, must be grounded, not on the fear of civil discord,
but on the freely won tolerance of our fellows. 6
261 have not been concerned in this paper with the situation of the judge
who faces an unjust law, but only with the plight of the citizen. Slesser, The Art
of Judgment and Other Studies 88 (1962), has recently taken the position that ajudge should enforce every duly enacted law regardless of his feelings about it.
The view of O'Meara, Natural Law and Everyday Law, 5 Natural L.F. 83, 84
(1960), is that a judge must resign when confronted with a law which he cannot
square with his conscience. There is a full discussion of the moral obligations ofjudges in Davis, The Moral Obligations of Catholic Civil Judges (1933). See also
MacGuigan, Positive Law and the Moral Law, 2 Current L. and Social Problems
89, 111-121 (1961).
